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Abstract 
Empirical studies are inconclusive about the underlying mechanisms that shape the 
interrelated dynamics of opinions and interpersonal attraction. There is strong 
evidence that others whom are liked have a positive influence on opinions and 
similarities induce attraction (homophily). We know less about “negative” 
mechanisms concerning whether disliked others induce shifts away from consensus 
(negative influence), whether large differences (dissimilarity) generate distancing, 
and whether dissimilarities induce disliking (heterophobia). This study tests 
discriminating hypotheses about the presence of positive and negative mechanisms in 
controlled experiments involving dyadic interactions. Results confirm the presence of 
homophily, do not support the existence of negative social influence, and show a 
robust positive linear relationship between opinion distance and opinion shifts. This 
implies that contact might provide the largest push towards consensus in case of large 
initial differences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social influence is a powerful force that is assimilative and fosters opinion 
convergence in groups (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, and Back 1950; Katz and 
Lazarsfeld 1955; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Nowak, Szamrej, and Latané 1990). 
People have been shown to assimilate their views to real or perceived opinions of 
others, even if they privately disagree (e.g., Asch 1956; Cialdini and Petty 1981; Kitts 
2003; Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009; Mason, Conrey, and Smith 2007 for a 
review). Yet, neither small groups nor organizations, neighborhoods, or society at 
large exhibit perfect consensus, as examples from group discussion experiments as 
well as studies of political, social and cultural views illustrate (e.g., Huguet, Latané, 
and Bourgeois 1998; Mark 2003; Glaeser and Ward 2006). Influence dynamics may 
even result in gradually increasing disagreement. This is suggested by studies of 
college students (Feldman and Newcomb 1969), international work teams (Early and 
Mosakowski 2000), and controversial issues in the public debate (Evans 2003; 
Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Levendusky 2009). 
Persistent diversity is not easy to reconcile with interpersonal influence (cf. 
e.g., Flache and Macy 2011a). Accordingly, a range of further possible mechanisms 
and social conditions have been proposed by theories of opinion differentiation. 
Structural explanations highlight heterogeneity in people’s interests or social 
backgrounds, the impact of opinion leaders and media, or social or geographical 
boundaries in society that inhibit consensus formation (Hegselmann and Krause 2000; 
Mark, 2003; Watts and Dodds 2007). In this paper, we examine an additional 
explanation that origins in different traditions in the classical social psychological 
literature. Balance theory (Heider 1946), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 
1957), and social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961) all justify that positive 
and negative social influence must be differentiated. They imply that people strive for 
agreement with a person who is close and liked and for disagreement with persons 
who are distant and disliked. A strive for cognitive balance is consistent with a 
motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance: individuals form their opinions in a way to 
maintain a consistent system of beliefs and attitudes, that is they strive for agreement 
with a person who is close and liked and for disagreement with persons who are 
distant and disliked; moreover, they evaluate similar others positively and evaluate 
dissimilar others negatively. 
 Recent – mostly formalized - theories on opinion dynamics have accepted the 
differentiation between positive and negative interpersonal influence (e.g., Macy et al. 
2003; Mark 2003; Jager and Amblard 2005; Kitts 2006; Salzarulo 2006; Baldassarri 
and Bearman 2007; Fent, Groeber, and Schweitzer 2007; Mason, Conrey, and Smith 
2007; Flache and Mäs 2008; Flache and Macy 2011a). As a result, their predictions 
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differ from earlier formal theories of social influence that only used positive influence 
and concluded that consensus in the group is inevitable, unless some subset of group 
members is entirely cut off from interaction (French 1956; Harary 1959; Abelson and 
Bernstein 1963; Abelson 1964; DeGroot 1974; Berger 1981; Wagner 1982; Smith and 
Conrey 2007: 95). Other models considered that individuals may retain some residue 
of their original positions no matter how large the influence of others (Friedkin and 
Johnsen 1990; 1999; 2011), but even in these models the resulting diversity is very 
limited in connected networks (cf. Friedkin 2001). In models that combine positive 
with negative influence this is different. If at the outset sufficiently many pairs of 
individuals experience negative social relationships (e.g., mutual disliking), then they 
distance themselves from each other and shift their opinions at the same time towards 
positively evaluated group members. The emergent tendency is bi-polarization: 
divergence towards opposite extreme opinions. Bi-polarization is amplified if – as 
some models assume – positive and negative influence are combined in a self-
reinforcing dynamic with two fundamental micro level mechanisms derived from 
social-psychological research. These are homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; 
Kandel 1978; Platow, Mills, Morrison 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook 2001), 
modeled as the tendency to like others who are perceived as similar; and 
heterophobia, the assumption that individuals dislike dissimilar others (Pilkington and 
Lydon 1997; Macy et al. 2003; Rydgren 2004; Flache and Mäs 2008; Berger and 
Dijkstra 2013). 
Given that the assumption of negative influence occupies a prominent place in 
the classical social psychology literature and in contemporary theories of opinion 
differentiation, it is of great importance to base this assumption on convincing 
empirical evidence. Most of the empirical research to which theoreticians refer stems 
from studies of interpersonal power and influence conducted between about 1950 and 
1970 (e.g., Mazen and Leventhal 1972), from more recent studies based on social 
categorization theory (e.g., Hogg, Turner, and Davidson 1990) and on majority and 
minority influence (e.g., Mucchi-Faina and Cicoletti 2006; Mucchi-Faina and 
Pagliaro 2008). The evidence they find for negative social influence, however, is 
inconclusive.  
Furthermore, previous empirical studies suffered from the difficulty of 
differentiating between the underlying mechanisms. Opinion distancing could occur 
as a result of dissimilarity to the source on one hand, and as a result of disliking the 
source on the other. But when dissimilarity and disliking are causally interrelated, as 
suggested by heterophobia, it is difficult to distinguish in field studies whether 
changes of opinions are due to one or the other or both. The lack of conclusive 
evidence and the methodological difficulties in identifying conditions for negative 
influence empirically have led us to conduct a series of laboratory experiments that 
test determinants of opinion change when subjects are exposed to interpersonal 
influence in a highly controlled computerized setting. Our experiments vary 
dissimilarity between the source and the self systematically, controlling for 
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simultaneous effects of liking and disliking in a longitudinal design. With this, we test 
predictions derived from theories of negative influence against competing theories 
that focus exclusively on positive influence and we distinguish between different 
explanatory mechanisms.  
 
 
NEGATIVE SOCIAL INFLUENCE: EVIDENCE AND 
COMPETING PROPOSITIONS 
 
Earlier evidence 
Experimental tests have hitherto not provided unequivocal evidence in support of 
negative influence. In laboratory experiments in the social categorization tradition, 
researchers typically informed participants about the opinions of members of 
fictitious in- and out-groups and then measured pre-test – post-test opinion shifts. It 
was expected that opinions of out-group members should induce negative influence. 
Yet, many studies did not find increasing differences between in- and out-group 
opinions at all (Lemaine 1975; Hogg et al. 1990; Krizan and Baron 2007), but only 
expectations of subjects about the opinion changes of other group members were 
found to be affected. Some experiments, in which social categorization processes 
were dominant, found conformity pressures to in-group members only (e.g., Abrams 
et al. 1990). Furthermore, some experimental designs did not allow disentangling 
positive influence from the in-group and negative influence from the out-group in the 
explanation of opinion shifts (e.g., van Knippenberg and Wilke 1988; van 
Knippenberg et al. 1990; Hogg et al. 1990). In these studies, participants were 
exposed to in-group members who held opinions relatively similar to their own, but 
some held more extreme opinions than the subject. Out-group members always had 
opinions distinct from those of the participants. Researchers found opinion changes 
away from the out-group opinion (Mackie 1986), but it is not clear whether these 
were caused by negative influence from the out-group or positive influence from 
more extreme in-group members.  
Moreover, earlier experiments could not differentiate whether opinion 
distancing occurred as a result of dissimilarity or disliking. Dissimilarity was often 
measured as perceived dissimilarity between the self and the source of influence 
along other (e.g., Mackie 1986; Platow, Mills, Morrison 2000), sometimes possibly 
along irrelevant dimensions. Furthermore, field experiments that extended over a 
longer time span did not control for general opinion drifts that occurred naturally 
(e.g., Sampson and Insko 1964; Mazen and Leventhal 1972).  
 
Positive social influence 
Next, we formulate hypotheses about all mechanisms more precisely and contrast 
predictions about negative influence to predictions derived from theories of positive 
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social influence. We begin with predictions about positive influence. The “null-
model” of interpersonal social influence is that there is always positive influence in 
interpersonal interaction. More precisely, when an individual is exposed to another 
opinion, he or she will shift his or her opinion towards the source, regardless of the 
level of (dis)similarity or (dis)liking. This resonates with experimental evidence about 
the effect of mere exposure to a stimulus, which has been found to enhance an attitude 
of an individual toward it (Zajonc 1968; Bornstein 1989; Harmon-Jones and Allen 
2001).  
A positive opinion-shift that is linear in the original opinion-distance 
corresponds to the earliest and simplest formal models of social influence (e.g., 
French 1956; DeGroot 1974; Berger 1981) that assume that individual opinions are 
updated as a weighted average of the opinions of relevant others. The larger the 
previous disagreement between the target and the source, the larger is thus the 
absolute shift of the target’s opinion towards the source (positive influence 
hypothesis) according to these theories. In these models, weights are exogenously 
given for each source-target pair and operationalize the strength of influence in that 
pair.   
 Mere exposure and the positive influence hypothesis neglect that opinion 
distance may also affect liking of the source. Four decades of research in the 
attraction paradigm showed that the larger the similarity, the larger is also the liking 
of the source (Byrne 1971; 1997). It has also been argued that similarity increases the 
perceived relevance of the source (e.g., Stotland, Zander, and Natsoulas 1961; Sherif 
and Hovland 1961; Burnstein, Stotland, and Zander, 1961; Brock 1965; Hass 1981), 
which in turn has been linked to attraction to and convergence towards the opinion of 
the source (e.g., Mazen and Leventhal 1972). Theories of positive influence link 
differences in perceived similarity to liking, but assume that a lack of similarity and 
liking does not evoke negative influence. Similarly, formal models explain stable 
opinion differentiation assuming that interpersonal influence only occurs as long as 
opinion dissimilarity between the source and the target does not exceed a critical level 
(Carley 1991; Axelrod 1997; Mark 1998; 2003; Hegselmann and Krause 2002, but 
see also Mäs, Flache, and Helbing 2010 on the fragility of these explanations).  
These models imply that, all other things being equal, the more similar 
opinions are initially, the more the target should move her opinion towards the source. 
But the smaller the initial disagreement, the less room there is on the opinion scale for 
a shift towards the opinion of the source. The interplay of these two opposing effects 
can be expected to generate an inverted U-shaped effect of the magnitude of initial 
disagreement on the magnitude of the positive opinion shift towards the source 
(similarity hypothesis). Subjects shift their opinion towards the source, but the 
magnitude of the shift should increase at a decreasing rate in distance, and even 
decline beyond some tipping point. The tipping point is defined by the relative 
steepness of the decline of liking in initial disagreement compared to the increase of 
the room for a positive shift that comes with more disagreement. Figure 1 illustrates 
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the resulting effect schematically, alongside with competing predictions discussed 
further below. The horizontal axis of the figure shows the extent of initial opinion-
disagreement. The vertical axis charts the predicted direction and magnitude of 
opinion change of the source. Positive values indicate a shift towards the source’s 
opinion. Further below we introduce hypotheses predicting negative influence, 
indicated in the figure by negative values that show a shift away from the source. The 
magnitude indicates how much in terms of the opinion scale the shift reduces or 
increases the prior disagreement. Figure 1 displays in addition the logical constraints 
imposed by the boundaries of the opinion scale, indicated by the straight lines above 
and below the range within which positive or negative opinion shifts can logically 
fall.  
 
 
Figure 1. Competing hypotheses about the effect of initial opinion distance on 
opinion shift.  
Notes: The alternating convergence-divergence hypothesis is depicted with two 
different parameter specifications. A mathematical justification for the figure can be 
found in the Supporting Material. 
 
The effect of similarity on opinion shifts can be supplemented or reinforced by 
the mediating variable of attraction towards the source. Byrne’s (1971; 1997) work on 
the attraction paradigm, has in particular specified the effects of similarity on 
similarity hypothesis 
dissimilarity effect 
alternating convergence-
divergence hypothesis 
max. 0 
0 
max. + 
max. - 
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attraction as a linear and causal relationship (Byrne 1971; 1997), hence attraction is 
updated as a consequence of opinion similarity. In turn, attraction and similarity could 
both have direct effects on opinion shifts. We test this possibility in experimental 
treatments where attraction is manipulated independently from opinion-distance.  
 
Negative influence 
The starting point of this study is that opinions do not necessarily change 
towards the source and evaluations do not necessarily change in favor of the source in 
interpersonal influence. Negative influence occurs when individuals change their 
opinions in order to increase opinion differences. According to the operationalized 
version of dissonance theory, a subject would reduce dissonance created by the 
dissimilarity of opinions (or discrepancy) by moving his opinion toward an attractive 
source (Festinger and Aronson 1960; Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith 1963). For 
negatively evaluated sources, however, balance can be restored by increasing 
dissimilarity with the perceived opinion of the source (Abelson 1964; Mazen and 
Leventhal 1972; Hogg et al. 1990). Research by Sampson and Insko (1964), for 
example, suggested that individuals tend to make judgments both in accord with liked 
others and contrary to disliked others (see also Schwartz and Ames, 1977).   
This is mirrored by research on persuasion. Beyond a certain point, additional 
discrepancy between a position recommended by the source and the initial position of 
the target may actually decrease persuasion (see Aronson et al. 1963; Abelson 1964; 
Hass 1981). Other studies have found that a dissimilar communicator may even evoke 
a “boomerang effect” (Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif 1957) where information from 
dissimilar others causes inverted attitude change (Sherif and Hovland 1961:Chapter 7; 
Perloff 1993). 
Discrepancy could also have an indirect effect on opinion dynamics through 
the derogation of the source or rejection. Heterophobia is the counterpart of 
homophily and describes the negative evaluation of others who are dissimilar 
(Pilkington and Lydon 1997; Flache and Mäs 2008). There is empirical evidence that 
people might be socially rejected (disliked) if they do not conform to the beliefs and 
opinions of their social group (Festinger and Thibaut 1951; Festinger et al. 1952). In 
the attraction paradigm, Byrne’s law specifies a positive linear relationship between 
similarity and attraction, which can be described by an empirically derived slope and 
intercept (Byrne 1997). From a positive intercept, it has been concluded that even for 
a maximum level of dissimilarity, attraction and not repulsion emerges (e.g., Byrne, 
Clore and Smeaton 1986). This conclusion, however, is wrong, because in these 
studies, both attraction and dislike were measured in the positive domain. It is more 
appropriate to select the mid-scale of measurement as a borderline in these studies: 
when the intercept falls below the mid-scale, there is evidence for the dissimilarity-
repulsion effect (Rosenbaum 1986; Smeaton, Byrne and Murnen 1989; Chen and 
Kenrick 2002).  
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Theories that link dissimilarity to negative opinion change imply that, all other 
things being equal, beyond a certain critical level of dissimilarity more disagreement 
induces a larger shift away from the source. However, like with positive influence, the 
magnitude of a negative opinion shift is logically constrained by the opinion interval. 
The more disagreement, the less room is left for even more disagreement. In absolute 
terms this implies a dissimilarity effect, which is the mirror image of the non-linear 
similarity hypothesis for positive influence. When initial opinion-disagreement 
exceeds a critical level, then further increase of initial disagreement should first 
induce an increasingly larger negative opinion shift away from the source’s opinion. 
Beyond a tipping point generated by the interplay of increasing need of distancing and 
decreasing room for disagreement, more initial disagreement should reduce the 
magnitude of negative opinion shift. 
Certain formal theories combine negative influence with positive influence 
(e.g., Macy et al. 2003; Flache and Macy 2011b; Skvoretz, 2013). More similarity 
induces a larger relative positive opinion shift when initial disagreement is relatively 
low. But beyond a critical level of disagreement, less similarity induces a relatively 
larger negative opinion shift.  Due to the constraints of opinion distances, this implies 
that the non-linear relationships of the similarity hypothesis and of the dissimilarity 
effect should obtain in separate regions of the scale of initial opinion disagreement. 
This combination generates a wave-shaped pattern. For low initial opinion-
disagreement, more disagreement first increases and then – beyond a tipping point – 
decreases the magnitude of a positive opinion shift. When initial opinion distance 
exceeds a critical level, the direction of opinion shift becomes negative. Beyond this 
point, further increases in initial opinion distance first increase the magnitude of the 
negative shift and then reduce it. This wave shaped pattern defines the alternating 
convergence-divergence hypothesis that we test in our experiment. We have also 
elaborated a formal derivation of this wave shaped pattern from the underlying 
assumptions of the related theories. This can be found in the Supporting Material of 
this paper. 
To give an overview, Figure 1 below summarizes the competing hypotheses 
for the effects of initial opinion disagreement on the direction and magnitude of the 
resulting opinion shift of the target of influence.  
  
Direction and magnitude of opinion changes and attraction: dependent variables 
We devised two computerized experiments to test competing predictions about effects 
of (dis)similarity and (dis)liking in interpersonal influence. The main dependent 
variable of our analyses captures a participant’s opinion shift after having received 
information about the opinion of another person (the source). To quantify both 
direction and magnitude of influence, opinions were always presented and measured 
on a bounded metric opinion scale ranging from zero to one hundred. The dependent 
variable opinion shift adopts a positive value if the participant’s opinion became more 
similar to that of the source. Negative values indicate an opinion shift away from the 
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opinion of the source. The magnitude of influence measures in both cases how much 
the initial opinion disagreement was reduced or increased by the opinion shift. The 
experiments focused on disentangling effects of two main independent variables: 
(dis)similarity and (dis)liking on opinion shift. The baseline condition was that 
subjects’ only information was the source’s opinion about the issue at stake, such that 
perceived (dis)similarity could relate only to the extent of prior (dis)agreement.  
Our second dependent variable is the attraction rating of the source by the 
subject. According to the homophily hypothesis, a larger extent of similarity implies 
more liking (higher attraction rates). In contrast, the heterophobia hypothesis states 
that a larger extent of disagreement (dissimilarity) contributes to more disliking. We 
test both hypotheses in the experimental conditions where we assured that only 
opinion similarities could contribute to the formation of attraction ratings. 
The methodological problem previous research has faced that disagreement 
has not been considered independently from disliking. We solved this problem by 
devising a method for introducing a variation in liking independently from the level of 
opinion disagreement between subjects. Inspired by social balance theory and social 
categorization theory, we induced negative evaluation of the source of influence by 
providing subjects with truthful (anonymous) triggers. With this, we could explore the 
effect of disliking that is not due to dissimilarity on opinion shift. According to the 
disliking-divergence hypothesis, strong (independently manipulated) disliking induces 
a negative opinion shift of the target of influence away from the source’s opinion.  
 
GENERAL METHOD 
 
Two experiments were conducted. Disliking was not manipulated 
independently in Experiment 1, but it was in Experiment 2. Both studies were 
designed with the aim to avoid potential shortcomings of previous research with four 
core design-features. First, participants were informed about the opinion of only one 
other participant of the experiment at a time, to assure that opinion shifts were not 
caused by multiple and potentially conflicting sources of influence. Second, to be able 
to statistically control for general trends in opinions, we measured participants’ 
opinions before and after being exposed to the opinions of others without any 
intermediate exposure to other sources of influence. Third, the experiments were 
designed to avoid that subjects would perceive the situation in in- and out-group 
terms. Fourth, subjects could not themselves select interaction partners and interacted 
with each other in a controlled manner. Subjects were aware that their financial 
compensation was not based on their decisions. In this way, alternative explanations 
of influence and attraction dynamics that are based on financial motives, on need for 
consensus, on endogenous interaction dynamics, on argumentation, on persuasive 
power, on source credibility (Clark, Evans, Wegener 2011), or on perceived threat (cf. 
Murray and Schaller 2012) could be excluded. 
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Subjects had to give their opinions on 31 issues (out of which 20 were used in 
Experiment 2, see Appendix). Issues were selected in multiple pilot studies from an 
initial list of 83 issues. The selection was based on perceived clarity, sufficiently high 
and sufficiently similar salience for participants (see Table A1); and certain desired 
distribution characteristics in answers (high variance of initial opinions and no 
concentration on round numbers). All opinions were measured on a 101 point 
“percentage” scale. Hence, opinion positions were discrete, but small changes could 
also be detected. We used this scale, because previous opinion dynamic experiments 
with a much lower number of answer categories found very little change (e.g., Huguet 
et al. 1998). Issues had furthermore no relation to objective knowledge (cf. Festinger 
1950) or to topics for which social desirability effects could be expected to bias 
responses. Attraction of the subject to the source was measured on a positive scale 
from 0 to 100, where zero was labeled as “very much disliking” and one-hundred as 
“very much liking”. The question was phrased in Dutch alike the formulation of 
Byrne (1971:427): “We would like to know your feelings about how much would you 
probably like this person.”  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Procedure. The experiment took place at the University of Groningen and 
lasted 45 minutes per session. Participants were randomly seated in cubicles. Subjects 
responded to a web-based questionnaire. They were first asked about their opinion on 
and subjectively perceived importance of 31 issues. Then for every subject an issue 
was selected and “pairs” were formed. Subjects were exposed to the opinion of the 
source they were paired with on the selected issue (first stimulus). This opinion was 
drawn from a pilot or an earlier session, which allowed using a web-based 
questionnaire without real online interactions.1  
After the first stimulus, participants rated how much they liked the source (the 
other person) and gave their own opinion again. This is followed by a second stimulus 
and repeated measurement of liking and opinions.2  
Each subject participated in 7 to 9 “pairs”. Per pair, a new issue was chosen. 
The order of issues followed a systematic selection procedure that avoided repetition 
and spread issues evenly across different positions in the sequence in which subjects 
                                               
1
 Subjects were reminded that all participants they are interacting with are real people who possibly 
took part in an earlier session. After the sessions, subjects have received an e-mail about the aim of the 
experiment and how interaction pairs were formed. This contained the following text: 
“…Consequently, participants were matched with other subjects, who in fact were from earlier 
sessions. This was due to technical reasons. (By using different software, we will be able to achieve in 
the following experiments that every participant is matched with another participant in the same 
session.)” 
2
 Our conclusions were not altered when we analyzed the impact of the second stimulus. The second 
stimulus had a much lower impact than the first. Details about the subsequent procedure and results are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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encountered the issues. Finally, subjects completed a questionnaire asking 
background data and motivations during the experiment.  
Subjects. Subjects (N=89) were first and second year students of sociology at 
the University of Groningen who participated as study requirement. They were 
involved in multiple matches, therefore we obtained 678 observations. N=617 cases 
were included in the analysis, pilot subjects3 and incomplete cases were excluded. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Effects of initial opinion disagreement on opinion changes  
The positive influence hypothesis, the similarity hypothesis and the alternating 
convergence-divergence hypothesis provide three competing expectations about the 
effect that the magnitude of the initial opinion-disagreement at the first stimulus has 
on the magnitude and direction of the subsequent opinion change of the subject.  
Figure 2 presents a descriptive analysis of the observed association. The horizontal 
and vertical axes of the figure are defined like in figure 1: the opinion distance 
between the initially measured opinion of the subject and the opinion of the source to 
which the subject was exposed at the first stimulus is shown on the horizontal axis 
and the change of distance after the first stimulus is on the vertical axis. For opinion 
shifts, positive values indicate by how many scale points the subject shifted towards 
the opinion of the source and negative values indicate by how many scale points the 
subject shifted away from the source’s opinion.4   
The curve fitted to the scatterplot in figure 2 shows the average association 
between the two variables across the 617 observations. It exhibits neither of the non-
linear patterns predicted by the similarity or the alternating convergence-divergence 
hypotheses. Instead, it seems to be most consistent with the positive influence 
hypothesis. On average, the larger the initial opinion disagreement, the more the 
subject shifts towards the opinion of the source.  
 In addition, we estimated random-intercept multilevel regression models 
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Raudenbush, Bryk, and Congdon, 2004) of opinion 
change after the first stimulus, controlling for the nestedness of opinion measurements 
in subjects. The regression models also included subject-level control variables. Most 
importantly, linear, quadratic and cubic terms for initial opinion-disagreement tested 
for the competing patterns predicted by the positive influence hypothesis, the 
similarity hypothesis and the alternating convergence-divergence hypothesis, 
respectively.  
 
                                               
3
 Pilot subjects were excluded because they had artificial partners.  
4
 Opinion shifts are calculated as the difference between the original absolute distance to the source 
x1=|oi1-oj1| and the new absolute distance to the initial opinion of the source |oi2-oj1| and |oiF-oj1|, where 
oi1 is the original opinion of the subject, oj1 is the initial opinion of the source, oi2 is the opinion of the 
subject after the first stimulus, and oiF  is the final opinion of the subject. 
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Figure 2: Opinion shifts in Experiment 1 by initial opinion distance with plotted 
lowess smoother: No support for a dissimilarity effect  
 
 Table 1 shows results for three models that successively add theoretically 
meaningful control variables. Based on previous work, we controlled whether 
subjects’ resistance to influence were correlated with gender (Guadagno and Cialdini, 
2002), study and labor market experience. In addition, model 3 in Table 1 
incorporates salience of the selected issue for the subject5. The analyses confirm the 
descriptive results. The relationship between initial opinion-disagreement and opinion 
change is best approximated by a positively sloped straight line, as predicted by the 
positive influence hypothesis (Table 1). Non-linear terms for distance are insignificant 
if included, which refutes both competing hypotheses. These conclusions are not 
altered when we enter control variables in the analysis. For instance, extremism did 
not have a significant effect when included in the models as some earlier work would 
suggest (e.g., Sherif and Hovland 1961; Haslam and Turner 1995). 
                                               
5
 Control variables did not have missing values except the variable “Works” for one subject. This 
single missing case has been replaced by the mean (0.54). 
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Interestingly, all intercepts of the models in Table 1 are negative and 
significant, suggesting that there was a baseline differentiation effect, which is just the 
opposite of mere exposure.  
 
Table 1: Results of multilevel regression of opinion change after the first stimulus 
Independent variables Model 1                   Model 2       Model 3  
FIXED EFFECTS    
Intercept -4.35 (1.32)** -4.40 (1.48)** -5.71 (2.53)* 
Case-level variables    
Distance  0.34 (0.09)***  0.35 (0.18)*  0.34 (0.17)* 
Distance2/100 -0.09 (0.14) -0.12 (0.57) -0.08 (0.56) 
Distance3/10000  0.02 (0.47) -0.01 (0.47) 
Salience of issue   -0.79 (0.78) 
Subject-level variables    
Gender (female=1)   1.72 (1.47) 
Year of study   0.75 (0.84) 
Works (yes=1)    1.48 (1.50) 
RANDOM EFFECTS    
intercept var. µ0 21.5*** 21.5*** 20.9*** 
level-1 σ2 159.9  160.2  160.2 
Model deviance 4943.556251 4942.02453 4928.76419 
Notes: N=617 cases for 89 subjects. Table shows restricted maximum likelihood 
HLM2 model estimates obtained in HLM 6. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. These are larger than conventional standard errors and have been used 
as the residual analysis indicated violations of multivariate normality. (Cases with 
missing values on the main variables have been excluded from the analyses.) All 
parameter estimates of distance effects are in the meaningful range. For the variance 
of the random intercept, the p-value is obtained from a χ2-test. The improvement of 
model deviance between Model 2 and 1 is not significant (χ2(1)=1.53, p=0.22), unlike 
the improvement between Model 3 and 2 (χ2(4)==13.26, p=0.9899). 
* significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level; *** significant at the 
0.1% level. 
 
Effects of initial opinion disagreement on liking and disliking  
The average rating of the source by the subject was 61.3 (SD=19.1) on an attraction 
scale that ranged from 0 to 100, suggesting that ratings were rather positive on 
average. However, 14.3% of the attraction ratings were below the middle of the 
attraction scale, indicating an unfavorable evaluation. Figure 3 shows a descriptive 
analysis of the association between initial opinion disagreement and attraction of 
rating of the source by the subject. The figure depicts a scatterplot of the 617 
observations of attraction ratings provided by the 89 participants.   
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of relationship between initial opinion disagreement and 
attraction measured after the first stimulus in Experiment 1 
 
The average association of the two variables in figure 3 is indicated by the declining 
quadratic function that was fitted to the data with its corresponding confidence 
interval (gray area). The direction of the association is consistent with homophily. For 
big initial opinion distances, the fitted line does not significantly fall below the 
midpoint of the attraction scale, suggesting that even big opinion distances failed to 
create feelings of disliking (heterophobia).  
To obtain a conclusive test, we estimated a multi-level regression model that 
controlled for the nesting of attraction ratings in participants and for individual-level 
control variables. The results reported in table 2 provide further support for a negative 
relationship between initial opinion-disagreement and attraction scores. Model 2 
supports in addition that the estimated relationship is curvilinear. The combination of 
the significant negative linear and positive quadratic effect of initial disagreement 
indicates that attraction rates decrease by opinion distance, but for large distances 
there is a slight increase. Most importantly, the estimated curve stays above the 
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neutral attraction score of 50. This pattern supports the homophily hypothesis, but it is 
inconsistent with the heterophobia hypothesis. Including control variables did not 
affect this conclusion, but revealed that female subjects gave higher attraction scores 
on average.  
 
Table 2: Results of multilevel regression of attraction ratings after first stimulus 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Intercept 69.81 (1.67)***  75.11 (3.71)***  
case-level variables     
Distance  -0.29 (0.04)***  -0.53 (0.11)***  
Distance2/100   0.33 (0.12)**  
Salience   -1.43 (0.94)  
Subject-level variables     
Gender (female=1)   7.30 (2.58)**  
Works (yes=1)   -3.72 (2.61)  
Year of study    -0.69 (1.19)  
RANDOM EFFECTS     
intercept var. µ0 109.73***  103.29***  
level-1 σ2 223.98  219.74  
Model deviance 5216.0  5189.0  
Notes: N=617 cases for 89 subjects. Table shows restricted maximum 
likelihood HLM2 model estimates obtained in HLM 6. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable “attraction” was measured on a 
0…100 scale. For the variance of the random intercept, the p-value is obtained form a 
χ
2
-test. The improvement of model deviance between Model 2 and 1 is significant 
(χ2(5)=27, p=0.9999). 
*** significant at the 0.1% level, ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level (two-tailed). 
 
BRIEF DISCUSSION 
Experiment 1 supports the positive social influence and the homophily hypotheses. 
The study did not support the hypotheses we derived from theories of negative 
influence. We found a small differentiation effect indicating a baseline tendency to 
differentiate one’s opinion from others, but this tendency was combined with a linear 
and positive effect of opinion-distance on opinion shifts towards the source.  
Experiment 1, however, did not allow us to appropriately test those hypotheses 
that address effects of disliking on opinion shifts (disliking-divergence hypothesis). 
This was because disliking was not manipulated independently from opinion-
disagreement so that a possible causal effect of disliking on opinion change could not 
be assessed.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Procedure. The experiment took place in Groningen and lasted one hour per 
session. For this experiment, new software was developed that allowed real-time 
computer-mediated communication between the subjects in a pair.6 The identity of 
partners in a pair was never revealed. Participants were invited in groups of 10 and 
were randomly seated in cubicles. First they were asked about their opinion and 
subjective importance attached to 20 issues (selected from issues in Experiment 1, see 
Table 1 in Appendix). Subjects were ensured that they interact with partners present 
in the laboratory, which was indeed the case.  
This led us to include two main design changes in the second experiment. 
First, we decided to manipulate interpersonal attraction, in order to increase the 
variance of attraction and provide a causal test. Second, subjects now interacted 
repeatedly with a real other participant so that both changes of opinions and changes 
of attraction to the other could be observed and tested. This way, we imposed a 
stronger and longer manipulation in Experiment 2 that triggered potentially a more 
intense sense of difference between subjects than the manipulation in Experiment 1.  
To test for the effect of disliking on opinion shift (disliking-divergence 
hypothesis), in one treatment, an independent attraction manipulation was used, 
before the first exposure to the opinion of the other participant (“treatment II”). A 
difficulty we faced in designing the experiment was to induce disliking 
experimentally in an ethical and sincere way. From earlier experiments we knew that 
subjects need to perceive the other subject either as someone who is a bad performer 
on a certain task, behaves  in an odd way, has negative or stigmatized characteristics, 
belongs to a disliked group, or acts offensively towards the subject. In the 
experiments of Sampson and Insko (1964), dislike was induced by a long procedure 
involving a failed cooperation task and an insult from the other party. In the 
experiments of Schwartz and Ames (1977), a negative referent was offending the 
subject. Keeping this in mind and in order to have sufficient variation in attraction 
ratings, we used a combination of three methods. We asked participants about their 
subject of academic study, they had to select an option in a regular Prisoner’s 
Dilemma task, and to choose between sending a stigmatizing or an overwhelmingly 
positive message to their interaction partner.7 Subjects learned that their decisions 
might be (but not necessarily will be) displayed on the screen of their partner. Next, 
information about the partner’s choices was displayed on the screen if the partner had 
a different subject of study, defected in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or sent a stigmatizing 
message. If the partner studied the same subject, cooperated, and sent a friendly 
                                               
6
 The software was developed by Vincent Hindriksen in Delphi.  
7
 The two possible messages were formulated as: 1. “I am a very nice person. I will do all my best to 
help you and nobody else in this experiment.”; 2. “You have to know that I want to do my best in this 
experiment and I do not care about what you are going to receive.”  
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message, this screen has been left empty. This manipulation was successful in 
achieving a variation in the initial attraction scores.8 For treatment II (N=100), a linear 
regression of initial attraction yielded estimated effects (standard errors are given 
between brackets) of 68.76 (3.47)*** (intercept)  –18.48 (4.39)*** (Defected), –11.86 
(4.53)** (Stigmatizing) –4.10 (4.16) (SameFaculty). The model fit was R2=0.29. 
Hence, only the difference in study direction was not a significant predictor of initial 
attraction. The other two manipulations had an additive effect and successfully 
decreased liking of the partner well below the mid-point of the attraction scale (50) 
that most likely has been understood as the neutral position.  
After the initial measurement of attraction, the opinion of the partner was 
presented and attraction and opinion were measured again. In addition, subjects could 
select one from the same list of persuasive messages to be sent to the other person. In 
the following screen, along with the opinion, the persuasive message that was sent by 
the partner was displayed, and attraction and opinion were recorded again. In case 
attraction was not manipulated, the procedure until this point was the same as in 
Experiment 1 except the attraction measurement at the start. In Experiment 2, 
however, this last step was repeated once more in both treatments: subjects could 
select a persuasive message again, they received this message from the partner along 
with his or her opinion, and they had to rate the partner and give their opinions again.9 
Subjects were matched with each other based on a complex algorithm 
developed and programmed by the first author. The algorithm excluded issues with 
insufficient variation in initial opinions, and was designed to simultaneously 
maximize the variance of initial opinion distances across pairs, the variance of 
distances to the opinion of the partner within the individual across matches, and to 
minimize the inequality of salience within pairs. The iterated algorithm selected 9 
issues that provided the best solutions for these criteria and determined a random 
sequence among these issues. As a consequence, subjects participated in 9 dyadic 
interactions, each with a different issue and an unknown partner. The experiment was 
followed by a questionnaire asking background data and motivations during the 
experiment. 
Subjects. Subjects (N=110) were students from all faculties of the University 
of Groningen gathered via board advertisements, lecture announcements, and 
advertisements in the university newspaper. Participants were paid 8 euro for their 
participation independently from their choices in the experiment. All subjects had in 
addition an equal chance to win 200 euro in a lottery. Subjects played 92 issue rounds 
in 11 sessions (920 valid cases). Data from one session (N=10) has been excluded 
from the analysis due to missing values of the dependent variable.  
 
 
                                               
8
 Attraction was measured the same way as in Experiment 1, on a scale of 0…100.  
9
 The further round of persuasion did not alter our conclusions about the main effects.   
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RESULTS 
 
Effects on opinion changes  
In treatment II of Experiment 2, attraction was independently manipulated with the 
aim to induce disliking. As we did not deceive subjects, there was a variation about 
the information subjects received during the manipulation and consequently also in 
the initial (dis)liking score. The mean attraction rate in treatment II was 56.67 
(SD=21.85), which is still above the midscale value, but significantly lower than at 
the first measurement in treatment I (60.22; t=2.47). With more disliking, we 
expected that negative opinion changes (away from the source) should occur more 
frequently in treatment II. Table 3 gives a description of the distribution of directions 
of opinion change across the treatments of the study, broken down into the categories 
of positive, negative and neutral (no) change. The table shows in addition how the 
direction of opinion change was associated with the mean initial opinion-
disagreement for the cases in the given category. For comparison, distributions are 
shown both for opinion change after the first stimulus and the aggregated opinion 
change that had resulted after all stimuli.  
 
Table 3: Number of cases for positive, negative, and no opinion shifts in Experiment 
2 after the first stimulus and after all stimuli.  
Treatment I after 1st 
stimulus 
Mean initial 
distance 
(SD) 
 after all 
stimuli 
Mean initial 
distance (SD) 
Positive shifts 132 (34.7%) 36.8 (21.8)  206 (54.2%) 35.1 (21.8) 
No change 220 (57.9%) 23.4 (22.6)  145 (38.2%) 19.9 (22.0) 
Negative shifts 28 (7.4%) 22.8 (20.4)   29 (7.6%) 18.2 (19.5) 
Total 380 28.0 (23.0)  380 28.0 (23.0) 
Treatment II      
Positive shifts 155 (33.0%) 37.7 (22.5)  253 (53.8%) 36.1 (22.1) 
No change 274 (58.3%) 26.5 (23.5)  173 (36.8%) 22.6 (23.8) 
Negative shifts 41 (8.7%) 17.4 (18.2)   44 (9.4%) 17.6 (18.8) 
Total 470 29.4 (23.6)  470 29.4 (23.6) 
Notes: Mean initial opinion distances for the corresponding cases are indicated.  
 
Table 3 shows that there is no discernible difference in the occurrence of negative 
opinion shifts between treatments I and II. Of all observed opinion changes after the 
first stimulus 7.4% and 8.7% were negative in treatment I and II, respectively. For the 
overall change after all stimuli this was 7.6% vs. 9.4%. While these figures indicate 
slightly more negative influence in treatment II, the average extent of shifts was not 
statistically different (d=-0.56, t=-0.67 for the first shift, d=-0.006, t=-0.007 after all 
stimuli). Moreover, comparison of the mean initial opinion distances associated with 
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the different categories shows that negative opinion shifts were associated with 
smaller initial distances rather than larger ones, contrary to what theories of negative 
influence suggest. This pattern was further confirmed when we conducted for 
Experiment 2 a descriptive analysis like the one presented in figure 2 for Experiment 
1. When we fitted a curve to the scatterplot of all observed pairs of initial opinion-
disagreement and opinion change after the first stimulus, the prevalent pattern was 
very similar to what we found in Experiment 1 (additional results are available upon 
request from the authors).  
To obtain a controlled test, we estimated random-intercept multilevel 
regression models of opinion change after the first stimulus separately for treatments. 
The only difference to the models estimated for Experiment 1 was that we added for 
treatment II terms that allowed assessing the unique contribution of the independently 
manipulated initial attraction, as well as its potential interaction with initial 
disagreement. Table 4 displays results. 
Results for treatment I show a somewhat different pattern than we obtained for 
Experiment 1. In its basic setup, Treatment I did not differ much from the design of 
Experiment 1 as the opinion of the source was the only stimulus for shifting an 
opinion. Results are similar in some aspects, but while in Experiment 1 we found a 
strong positive linear effect of initial opinion disagreement on the magnitude of 
positive opinion shift, results of treatment I in Experiment 2 lend some support for 
non-linear effects of initial disagreement. For ease of interpretation, figure 4 below 
shows the predicted association between initial opinion-disagreement and the 
resulting opinion shift for different models that we estimated. Both models 1 and 2 in 
table 4 comprise significant effects of initial disagreement (positive) as well as initial 
disagreement squared (negative). Moreover, the cubic term of initial disagreement in 
model 2 has a positive effect that is close to being statistically significant at the 
p=0.05 level.  The graphical analysis in figure 4 shows that the estimated curve 
remotely resembles the wave-shape predicted by the alternating convergence-
divergence hypothesis (also shown in the figure). Unfortunately, this cannot be 
interpreted as support of the hypothesis. On closer inspection, we find that the 
estimated curve falls predominantly into the region of positive opinion shifts. This 
holds in particular for large initial opinion disagreement, in contradiction with the 
hypothesis. Moreover, at all levels of initial disagreement the estimated curve does 
not exhibit a negative slope, thus also contradicting the pattern predicted by the 
similarity hypothesis. Despite the differences with Experiment 1, we conclude that 
also the results for treatment I in Experiment 2 are best approximated by the positive 
effect predicted by the positive influence hypothesis. This also holds for the results 
obtained for treatment II, as models 3 and 4 exemplify. While initial opinion 
disagreement had a significant and positive effect on opinion change, the non-linear 
effects of initial disagreement were not significant. Moreover, also here the estimated 
curves fall predominantly into the region of positive opinion shifts (see figure 4). As a 
 20
further test, we estimated similar models also for the second opinion shift in treatment 
II, with the same overall result (available upon request).10 
 
Table 4: Results of multilevel regression of first opinion change in Experiment 2 
(change in absolute distance to the initial opinion of the source)  
Independent variables Treatment I Treatment II 
FIXED EFFECTS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -3.14 
(0.88)*** 
-1.19 (1.77) 1.34 (1.70) -0.66 (2.16) 
case-level variables     
Distance  0.64 
(0.19)***  
0.63 
(0.19)*** 
0.28 (0.13)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Distance2/100 -1.53 (0.75)* -1.51 (0.74)* -0.67 (0.46) -0.70 (0.46) 
Distance3/10000 1.28 (0.71)11 1.26 (0.70)12 0.49 (0.38) 0.51 (0.38) 
Initial attraction   -0.07 (0.03)* -0.07 (0.03)* 
Attraction * distance   0.0027 
(0.0013)* 
0.0027 
(0.0013)* 
Salience of issue  -0.20 (0.59)  0.77 (0.62) 
Subject-level variables     
Gender (female=1)  -0.82 (1.41)  1.16 (1.37) 
Works (yes=1)  -0.86 (1.36)  0.52 (1.10) 
Master student (yes=1)   -2.60 (1.28)*  -0.31 (1.07) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
intercept var. µ0 15.65*** 15.31*** 0.85 0.46 
level-1 σ2 100.9  101.2  127.6  128.4  
Model deviance 2882.3 2869.3 3636.6 3626.7 
Notes: N=380 cases in treatment I; N=470 cases in treatment II for 100 
subjects in each treatment. Missing values (N=9) for the Works variable have been 
imputed by the overall mean (0.411). The interaction variable Attraction*distance was 
simply created as multiplying the Attraction (scale: 0…100) and the Distance (scale: 
0…+100) variables. Table shows restricted maximum likelihood HLM2 model 
estimates obtained in HLM 6. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. All 
parameter estimates of distance effects are in the meaningful range. 
* significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 0.1% level. For testing 
random effects χ2 tests are used.  
                                               
10
 Opinion shifts after the second stimulus were far smaller than shifts after the first stimulus. This is in 
line with other experimental findings on social influence. Moreover, the smaller shifts after the second 
stimulus were in the same direction as first shifts and could even be described with the same 
underlying mechanisms except they were smaller in size. These results clearly demonstrate that a 
longer interaction is not different qualitatively from a short influence process and it is the first 
impression that matters the most. 
11
 p=0.071 for robust standard errors, p=0.000 for regular standard errors. 
12
 p=0.072 for robust standard errors, p=0.000 for regular standard errors. 
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initial opinion distance
 
Figure 4. The curvilinear relationship between opinion distance and opinion shifts in 
Experiment 2, based on the parameter estimates of Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 
(first shift) and Model 1 for the second shift (available upon request)  
 
The effects of independently manipulated attraction on opinion change after 
the first stimulus allow testing the disliking-divergence hypothesis. Remarkably, we 
find a significant negative effect of attraction on opinion change (models 3 and 4, 
table 4). This contradicts the hypothesis that postulates that disliking rather than liking 
reduces and even inverts positive opinion shifts. The main effect of attraction, 
however, is to be interpreted in combination with the positive interaction effect of 
initial disagreement and that of initial attraction. For interpretation of the overall 
effect of disliking on opinion change in treatment II, we compared the average 
opinion change between observations, for which the subject indicated disliking of the 
source, to those where liking was indicated, broken down by small vs. large initial 
opinion disagreement (Figure 5). Results do not support the disliking-divergence 
hypothesis. Overall, average opinion changes were positive in all categories. This 
pattern of results shows no indication of negative opinion shifts induced by disliking.   
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Figure 5. Direction and average magnitude of opinion change after first 
stimulus in treatment II (with attraction manipulation) of Experiment 2, broken down 
by liking vs. disliking and small vs. large initial distances. 
Note: small: distance below average, big: distance above average 
 
Effects of initial opinion disagreement on liking and disliking  
We tested the homophily hypothesis and the heterophobia hypothesis with multilevel 
regression models of subject’s attraction towards the partner, which was measured 
after the first stimulus. Again, the main difference compared to Experiment 1 was that 
we estimated models separately for treatments I and II, and controlled in treatment II 
for effects of independently manipulated attraction ratings. Table 5 displays the 
results.  
All models in table 5 show that attraction ratings declined in initial opinion-
disagreement. The large intercept terms show that on average, subjects like their 
partner when initial disagreement is relatively small. For treatment I, we observe that 
unlike in Experiment 1, estimated liking turns into disliking when initial disagreement 
exceeds a critical level. For maximum initial differences, predicted ratings drop well 
below the mid-point of the scale of attraction (50), especially after controlling for 
background variables in model 2. These results are consistent with the homophily 
hypothesis and lend some support to the heterophobia hypothesis. In treatment II, 
attraction (disliking) was manipulated independently first. Initial attraction ratings 
have therefore been included in the analysis. It turned out that attraction ratings 
determined the next measurement to a large extent (see the parameter for initial 
attraction in models 3 and 4 in table 5). The significant positive intercept in models 3 
and 4 indicates a general tendency to evaluate the partner more positively after the 
first stimulus than before. Still, for large initial distances, estimated attraction ratings 
are below the midscale value, supporting the heterophobia hypothesis.  
 
 23
Table 5: Results of multilevel regression of attraction ratings after the first stimulus in 
Experiment 2. 
Independent variables Treatment I Treatment II 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Intercept 67.91 
(1.94)*** 
70.25 
(4.82)*** 
30.52 
(3.27)*** 
35.64 
(5.56)*** 
case-level variables     
Distance  -0.27 
(0.04)*** 
-0.38 
(0.11)*** 
-0.21 
(0.04)*** 
-0.40 (0.13)** 
Distance2/100  0.0015 (0.001)  0.0011 (0.001) 
Initial attraction   0.59 (0.04)*** 0.53 (0.08)*** 
Distance * attraction    0.002 (0.0016) 
Salience  -0.67 (1.25)  0.76 (1.00) 
subject-level variables     
Gender (female=1)  1.92 (3.76)  1.06 (2.17) 
Works (yes=1)  -3.45 (3.34)  -2.68 (1.68) 
MA student (yes=1)  -1.57 (3.17)  -4.76 (1.57)** 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
intercept var. µ0 159.02*** 163.13*** 10.80 4.20 
level-1 σ2 239.69  239.58  279.93  279.87  
Model deviance 3110.7 3101.6 3831.7 3828.2 
Notes: N=360 cases in treatment I and N=450 cases in treatment II for 90 
subjects in each treatment. The dependent variable is the attraction score measured 
after the first stimulus (first display of the opinion of the pair). Note that this is the 
first attraction measurement in treatment I and the second measurement in treatment 
II. Table shows restricted maximum likelihood HLM2 model estimates obtained in 
HLM 6. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. (Cases with missing 
values have been excluded from the analyses.) 
*** significant at the 0.1% level, ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at 
the 5% level (two-tailed). 
 
BRIEF DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 was designed to induce disliking with an independent attraction 
manipulation (treatment II) and to allow assessing causal relations between attraction 
and opinion shift in this way. Contrary to what theories of negative influence suggest, 
the results do not support that disliking induces negative influence. We find some 
evidence that large initial disagreement triggers disliking. Yet, overall, average 
opinion changes were positive and became more so to the extent that initial 
disagreement was larger. Again, this result lends most support to the positive 
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influence hypothesis that larger opinion differences induce a larger positive shift 
towards the source.  
 
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Negative influence occurs when individuals change their attitudes in order to increase 
opinion differences to negatively evaluated others. Negative influence has been 
considered in different classical social psychological theories and has been re-
invented recently in models to explain opinion differentiation and bi-polarization; 
outcomes that are difficult to reconcile with earlier models of opinion formation. 
Despite this prominent place of negative influence in the classical social 
psychological literature and in recent theories of opinion dynamics, there is a dearth 
of reliable empirical evidence for this mechanism at the micro-level of interpersonal 
influence. To address this, we conducted two experimental studies in a highly 
controlled computer-mediated setting, in which we systematically varied the initial 
opinion-disagreement between a subject and a source of opinion, and the liking or 
disliking of the source independently.  
We articulated a number of hypotheses from alternative sets of assumptions on 
social influence and tested these with the data obtained from the two experimental 
studies. Overall, results are more supportive for theories of positive influence than 
they are for theories of negative influence. Most importantly, even when attraction 
was manipulated (disliking in Experiment 2), it did not trigger opinion shift away 
from the opinion of the source, which was predicted by theories of negative influence. 
The strongest and most general effect we found is a positive linear effect of opinion 
distance on opinion shifts13. A linear effect of opinion distance is in line with classical 
models of social influence (e.g., French, 1956). This finding implies for models of 
opinion dynamics that a complex non-linear social influence function might be 
unnecessary to characterize the relationship between similarity and opinion change. 
Our results suggest that not only for the sake of simplicity, but also for the sake of 
realism, model builders should be cautioned against resorting too readily to a more 
complex assumption than a simple linear influence function. 
We found clear support for homophily in our experiments, but only mixed 
evidence for heterophobia, which could be evoked by large initial disagreement 
between a subject and a source of influence. In Experiment 1 we did not find evidence 
to support the heterophobia hypothesis, but in Experiment 2 we did. Large initial 
disagreement induced disliking in this experiment, but contrary to theories of negative 
influence, this was not associated with negative opinion shifts. In short, our findings 
are only partly consistent with a motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger 
1957; Festinger and Aronson 1960; Aronson et al. 1963) and with predictions of 
social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Individuals might have formed 
                                               
13
 Mavrodiev, Tessone, and Schweitzer (2013) recently reported a similar finding for a social influence 
experiment in which subjects had to guess the right answer to a factual question.  
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their opinions in a way to build and maintain a consistent system of beliefs and 
opinions, but this was not strictly differentiated based on liking of the source. Subjects 
in our experiments tended to shift their opinions towards those of the source, 
irrespective of their evaluation. This might be because people in general do not easily 
distance away their opinion from others, even if the other one has an extreme position 
or is not very much liked. Yet a possible interpretation is that the most distant 
opinions were the most disturbing for the subjects, but they reduced dissonance only 
by shifting opinions towards the source, and never by moving away from or by 
derogating the source. This might mean that despite the successful manipulations, 
“liking” and “disliking” in our experiments were not of crucial importance for opinion 
formation and cognitive balance. 
 There are several caveats and limitations concerning our studies and the 
generalizability of our results. Arguably, our artificial laboratory setting with 
computer-mediated anonymous interaction may have suppressed the emotional 
processes that in field settings induce disliking and rejection of others’ opinions. In 
case of face-to-face encounters, subjects’ visible characteristics, sexual attraction, and 
facial expressions would be important variables that are difficult to measure and to 
control for. We could exclude such factors, but the cost may have been that we could 
not observe some of the negative influence dynamics that might occur in field 
settings. We cannot claim ex post, however, that our manipulations were 
insufficiently “weak”. These manipulations were not weak for positive social 
influence as half of the subjects shifted their opinions as a result of receiving 
information about the opinion of their partner towards the source. Ex ante, we did not 
want to create an experimental setting that is able to prove the existence of negative 
influence. We intended to test hypotheses about the existence of the hypothesized 
effects in simple and standard experimental situations in line with the theoretical 
assumptions made in important theories.   
We have reduced the social influence setting to interaction in dyads, without 
any concept of groups with which subjects might identify or they might reject as 
negatively evaluated out-group. This was done on purpose, and could be relaxed in 
future research.  
Another important note is that in roughly half of the cases, subjects did not 
change their opinions at all. This was partially because subjects were biased towards 
round numbers on the opinion scale most of the time; more so for attraction scores 
than for opinions. Furthermore, our analyses indicate that much of the variation in 
subjects’ attraction ratings and opinion changes is not explained by the initial 
disagreement or initial attraction.  Individuals seem to vary on how open they are to 
positive and negative influence, how persuasive they are and how intolerant they are 
for large inconsistencies of opinions (e.g., Janis et al. 1959; Hovland and Rosenberg 
1960; Rosenberg 1960; Eagley 1981; Clark, Evans, Wegener 2011). While we tried to 
capture some of this variation with individual level controls, future research could 
improve upon this and include measures of corresponding personality variables.  
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Overall, our research provides a highly controlled test of some of the 
assumptions on negative social influence that have a prominent place in the classical 
social psychological literature and in recent models of opinion formation. We find 
only very little evidence that these assumptions serve well to describe the behavior of 
subjects in the computer-mediated social influence settings of our experiment. We 
cannot exclude that negative influence may occur under conditions in the laboratory 
or field that we have not captured in our experiments. We think, however, that our 
findings point to the need to inspect more carefully by which mechanisms and under 
what conditions negative influence is a plausible assumption in theories of opinion 
dynamics. 
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 APPENDIX 
Issues used in the experiments 
 
Table A1. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of original opinions (O) 
and saliences (S) for issues used in the experiments 
Issues Experiment 
1 (N=89) 
Experiment 
2 (N=110) 
 O S O S 
1. The warning signs on cigarette boxes should cover 
0…100 percent of the box total surface. 
43.4 
(29.5) 
2.04 
(.78) 
44.5 
(29.5) 
2.20 
(.88) 
2. Smoking should be allowed at 0…100 percent of 
tables in café’s. 
32.8 
(27.5) 
1.71 
(.57) 
23.6 
(27.1) 
1.75 
(.75) 
3. The introduction of the euro brings advantages 
and disadvantages to us. 0…100 percent of all 
effects are advantages. 
51.4 
(23.3) 
2.16 
(.74) 
55.6 
(24.9) 
2.30 
(.76) 
4. The government should subsidize public transport 
in 0...100 percent. 
69.8 
(22.5) 
1.56 
(.58) 
65.7 
(22.4) 
1.65 
(.60) 
5. A demonstration needs police protection. 
Organizers should pay 0…100% of the costs of this. 
51.1 
(33.1) 
2.21 
(.67) 
44.0 
(34.0) 
2.35 
(.67) 
6. 0…100 percent of immigrants who come to the 
Netherlands for economic reason should receive a 
residence permit. 
34.8 
(29.6) 
1.83 
(.63) 
36.3 
(29.6) 
1.82 
(.68) 
7. Foreigners who want a residence permit for the 
Netherlands should pay 0…100 percent of their 
integration courses and tests. 
43.0 
(33.5) 
1.92 
(.79) 
42.2 
(35.2) 
1.96 
(.81) 
8. 0...100 percent of the streets in the centre of 
Groningen should have security camera surveillance.  
32.0 
(27.1) 
2.15 
(.70) 
33.7 
(31.1) 
2.17 
(.78) 
9. Sport activities of students should be financed by 
the university in 0…100% of total costs. 
49.9 
(26.3) 
2.18 
(.67) 
52.2 
(27.8) 
2.20 
(.81) 
10. Universities should be financed in 0…100 
percent by tuition fees.  
40.0 
(22.5) 
1.91 
(.67) 
36.7 
(22.0) 
2.03 
(.64) 
11. The final grade of the overall study should be 
determined in 0…100 percent by the result of the 
Master’s thesis. 
41.9 
(21.9) 
2.13 
(.73) 
32.6 
(20.3) 
2.35 
(.71) 
12. Somebody who is caught to draw graffiti should 
pay a fine of 0...100 euro. 
49.9 
(28.6) 
2.47 
(.66) 
52.0 
(28.1) 
2.52 
(.62) 
13. The fine for not cleaning up after your dog 
making dirt on the street should be 0…100 euro. 
43.3 
(31.5) 
2.28 
(.77) 
38.6 
(25.8) 
2.25 
(.64) 
14. The CEO of an industrial company has a limited 
budget for building a new plant. This budget has to 
be divided between employing additional employees 
48.4 
(20.5) 
1.88 
(.72) 
45.7 
(20.7) 
1.83 
(.59) 
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and investing in measures that protect the 
environment. 0…100 percent of the available budget 
should go to environment-protecting measures. 
15. The government has to divide an available 
budget between two options: building new highways 
or new high-speed railway tracks. 0…100 percent of 
these resources should be used to build new high-
speed railway tracks. 
62.0 
(20.4) 
1.88 
(.64) 
65.8 
(19.2) 
1.84 
(.57) 
16. Schools in disadvantaged areas should receive 
0…100 percent more financing than schools that are 
not in disadvantaged areas. 
33.0 
(19.7) 
1.85 
(.59) 
34.9 
(21.2) 
1.80 
(.54) 
17. The Dutch military has to divide 100 million 
euros between activities within the national borders, 
such as national defense and training, and missions 
outside the country. Foreign missions should receive 
0…100 million euros. 
45.1 
(20.2) 
2.22 
(.65) 
45.4 
(22.5) 
2.39 
(.85) 
18. Students should pay 0...100 percent of the costs 
of language courses offered by the university. 
36.6 
(25.0) 
2.29 
(.79) 
33.7 
(26.2) 
2.17 
(.78) 
19. Foreign students should pay 0...100 percent of 
their Dutch language courses. 
42.8 
(27.1) 
2.26 
(.73) 
31.5 
(28.3) 
2.17 
(.73) 
20. Students should spend a maximum of 0…100 
percent of the 40 hours weekly working time on paid 
work. 
41.2 
(27.4) 
2.34 
(.80) 
52.8 
(32.4) 
2.54 
(.81) 
21. In a family with two children, in which the 
husband works and the wife stays at home, the wife 
should take 0…100 percent of the household duties. 
71.9 
(12.6) 
2.15 
(.68) 
  
22. The local government faces two alternatives for 
extending the amount of housing: to build on non-
residential areas or to rebuild, renovate or extend 
existing buildings. 0…100 percent of the resources 
should be devoted to build on non-residential areas. 
30.2 
(21.0) 
2.03 
(.73) 
  
23. The government should finance propagation of 
modern poetry in 0…100 percent of costs.  
20.4 
(24.5) 
3.01 
(.79) 
  
24. The government should pay 0...100 percent of 
the costs of child day-care. 
56.9 
(25.0) 
1.73 
(.56) 
  
25. A new shopping center is built. The costs of 
building a street to the shopping center has to be paid 
in 0…100 percent by the shopping center.  
49.6 
(26.8) 
2.51 
(.62) 
  
26. A maximum of 0…100 percent of the total EU 
budget should be spent on agriculture. 
23.7 
(15.1) 
2.27 
(.75) 
  
27. Israel should pay 0…100 percent of the costs of 56.5 1.93   
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rebuilding in Lebanon. (28.4) (.70) 
28. For the problems around integration in the 
Netherlands the responsibility goes in 0…100 
percent to Muslims (0 = the responsibility is in 0% of 
Muslims, and in 100% is of non-Muslims). 
38.9 
(26.7) 
1.84 
(.88) 
  
29. A professor at the university should spend 
0…100 percent of his or her working time on 
teaching (thus not on research and not on 
administrative duties). 
45.0 
(21.2) 
2.27 
(.73) 
  
30. The final grade of a subject should be determined 
in 0…100 percent by a result of a written exam. 
71.3 
(17.9) 
2.02 
(.71) 
  
31. Students should spend 0…100 percent of the 40 
hours weekly working time on their study. 
64.3 
(19.9) 
2.06 
(.82) 
  
Notes: All issues were measured on a 0…100 percentage scale. Salience was 
measured on an ordinal scale: “How important…” with answer categories “very 
important”=1, “important”=2, “unimportant”=3, “very unimportant”=4. Formulations 
are independent back-translations from Dutch. 
